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2. TITO COMMENTS ON HIS MOSCOW VISIT

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25X1A	President Tito told Ambassado Riddleberger on 29 June that Seleaders had not exerted any pronum on him during his Moscow vision that the joint communique was largely the result of slav suggestions. He said that there was no discumpled whatsoever of military relations, which would have completely contrary to Yugoslav policy.	oviet essure t and f Yugo ssion


Tito is convinced that all Communist parties will eventually be free from Stalinist concepts and will reassert their right to dissent from Moscow, and that his policy of establishing bilateral contacts with all "Socialist" parties will help in accomplishing this end. He pointed to Togliatti's attitude as a clear indication of ferment in Western Communist parties and predicted more of these "positive developments." Tito cited Togliatti's visit to Belgrade and the results of his own trip to Moscow as contributing to these developments.

He said that for internal reasons Khrushchev must move slowly in revising Stalin's policies. He feels that Khrushchev has undoubtedly strengthened his position, but that Stalinist elements remain. Tito counseled patience and more contact on the part of the West with Soviet leaders, remarking that the "devil is sometimes not as black as painted."

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3. ARGENTINA ORDERS MILITARY ALERT AGAINST POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES



While the regime's position was apparently strengthened for the immediate future by its quick action at that time, the attempted revolt and continued plotting re-emphasize the considerable political discontent, especially over the slow progress in the return to constitutional government. This discontent and widespread shock over the government's summary execution of rebels earlier this month apparently have given new impetus to the regime's consultations with political leaders regarding constitutional reform and scheduling elections.

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25X1A	The changes in the Egyptian cabinet announced on 29 June have the primary effect of removing from top posts the members of the former Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). While the changes may give the regime a more moderate tone, they do not indicate any significant shift in the direction of Egyptian policy.
*	Gamal Salim, former deputy prime minister whose brother Salah Salim was forced to resign last year, and ex-minister of state Anwar Sadat have been noted for their extremely nationalistic and anti-Western manifestos. Hassan Ibrahim, the third RCC member dropped, reportedly was among those who strongly opposed Salah Salim's resignation. Little is known of the two new civilian appointees.
	The officers who have been dropped presumably will be treated similarly to Salah Salim, who is now publishing a "controlled opposition" newspaper with funds supplied by the government. Nasr's careful treatment of such individuals indicates he is fully aware that they could form a nucleus for future army opposition to the regime.
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5.	BELGIAN SENATE	APPROVES PROPOSED VISIT	OF
	DADLIAMENTARY	DELEGATION TO DEIDING	

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Press reports that the Belgian Senate has approved the proposed visit of a Belgian parliamentary delegation to Communist China as well as to Taiwan

indicate that the controversial trip to the Far East will almost certainly take place. It had been tentatively scheduled for September.

Foreign Minister Spaak had previously told Ambassador Alger that he could not intervene in an essentially parliamentary matter. Belgian motives in undertaking the trip are probably a mixture of curiosity, Liberal interest in trade possibilities, and Socialist views on the desirability of contacts with the Orbit.

The delegation will be headed by the president of the lower chamber, Camille Huysmans, whose rather neutralist ideas are not shared by most of his Socialist colleagues.

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B	TISSR	OFFERS	DIPI	OMATIC	REL	ATIONS	TO	LAOS

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The USSR has offered to recognize the Kingdom of Laos and establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, according to a Laotian government communique. Laos will probably agree to reciprocal recognition rather than affront the USSR, but will politely evade diplomatic and other exchanges, according to the American embassy in Vientiane.

moscow probably feels that the time is right to extend neutralism in Southeast Asia by seeking in Laos relations similar to those the bloc is now developing with the adjoining country of Cambodia, where neutralism is already firmly established. The USSR has undoubtedly noted with approval the increasing Laotian interest in neutralism as well as the cautiously favorable Laotian response to overtures from Peiping.

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